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ABSTRACT
Communication technologies are commonplace in modern society. For many
years there were only a handful of communication technologies provided by large
companies, namely the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and mobile
telephony; these can be referred to as traditional communication technologies.
Over the lifetime of traditional communication technologies has been little
technological evolution and as such, law enforcement developed sound methods
for investigating targets using them. With the advent of communication
technologies that use the Internet – Internet-based or contemporary
communication technologies – law enforcement are faced with many challenges.
This paper discusses these challenges and their potential impact. It first looks at
what defines the two technologies then explores the laws and methods used for
their investigation. It then looks at the issues of applying the current
methodologies to the newer and fundamentally different technology. The paper
concludes that law enforcement will be required to update their methods in order
to remain effective against the current technology trends.
Keywords: digital forensics, digital investigation, communication technologies,
telecommunications interception, post mortem analysis
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1. INTRODUCTION
“when I was your age,
the phone was tied to the wall with a kinky, twisty three and a half foot cord,
it’s hard to believe but it had a ring that could not be turned off or ignored,
we couldn’t choose the sound of the ring, it was just the sound we called ‘the phone’,
we’d never heard of a ring tone”1

Digital communication technologies are fundamental to modern society and form
a worldwide network allowing people to communicate efficiently. Traditionally,
there have been relatively few distinct communication technologies. PSTN and
Mobile Phones have dominated the communications landscape forming a single
conceptual network. These technologies can be thought of as traditional
communication technology. Traditional communication networks have changed
very little over their extensive lifespan. With the recent widespread adoption of
the Internet, novel communication technologies are increasingly available. In
contrast to traditional communication technologies these can be referred to as
contemporary or Internet-based communication technologies. There are many
advantages to using Internet-based communication technologies and these have
been realised by both users and providers of services. However, such advantages
are one side of the proverbial “double edged sword” and may be disadvantageous
within other contexts. This is particularly relevant to law enforcement as
contemporary communication technologies present significant challenges to the
ability to gain evidence and intelligence about their use in an investigation.
It is common for law enforcement agencies to conduct investigations as part of
their duties. Recovering information about targets can be performed in many
ways. Investigation methodologies may be thought of as a series of methods and
procedures to recover information in a given context. Investigation methodologies
for recovering information about a target’s communications are commonly
employed by law enforcement. Traditional communication technologies have
been in use for many years and have changed very little over this time. This has
allowed the development of highly effective and rigorous investigation
methodologies for these technologies. Internet-based communication technologies
by contrast are very different. Their technological operation is based on a
fundamentally different paradigm; this leads to several fundamental functional
differences. Due to these inherent differences, the existing methodologies used by
law enforcement may not be adequate for situations involving contemporary
communication technologies and this is a significant problem as they are
becoming more prevalent.
In order to understand how the shift in technology affects investigation
methodologies of law enforcement it necessary to understand the differences
between the technologies. It is rudimentary to identify the primary technological
difference however, it is necessary to delve deeper in order to find the issues that
1
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affect the investigation methodologies. An understanding of the underpinnings of
all communication technologies is needed before exploring the specifics of both
types individually. All technologies use the concept of ‘services’ to designate
functions of the various parts of the system. An understanding of what these
services are and do is necessary in order to understand holistically how
communication systems operate. The concept of services is also tied closely to the
legislation that affects communication technologies in Australia. By exploring the
background and operation of traditional and contemporary communication
technologies, certain properties of the latter can be identified that are contrary to
the former. These properties embody functional differences, which can be used to
explore in a practical manner where the weaknesses in the current methodologies
are.
The methodologies for investigation of communication technologies are
comprised of three main methods: communications interception, access of
retained information and post-mortem analysis. Each of these uses different
vectors of access and gain different types of information; the situation context will
dictate which should be used. These methods are well suited to the investigation
of traditional communication technologies and it is a combination of many factors
that contributes to their success. However, these methods may not be successful in
many situations where contemporary communication technologies are being used.
The reasons for this can be explored by looking at the application of the methods
to traditional communication technologies and contrasting this with the known
functional differences identified by comparing the technologies. This shows what
properties of contemporary communication technologies are responsible for the
ineffectiveness of the methods. The practical implications of the mismatch in
methods can be further explored with a case study. Three separate incidences are
presented that describe situations of criminal activity and how law enforcement
used one of the investigation methods to gain information that was subsequently
used as evidence in a court of law. A hypothetical alternative is then presented for
each case to demonstrate how the methods used may have failed where the target
used an Internet-based communication technology.
This paper seeks to show how the shifting paradigm of communications is
changing the requirements for law enforcement. It is important that they are able
to carry out their role effectively in order to prevent or stop criminal activity.
Knowing the failings of the current methodologies may help the development of
new methodologies for the current environment. This paper provides a first step
for carrying out future research in this direction.
2. COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
Traditional and contemporary communication technologies are tools that support
human-to-human communication. The ways in which they operate to fulfil this
task however is very different. Common to all types of technology is the concept
of services. A holistic communication service is itself comprised of multiple
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services. These form a hierarchy, with the conceptually lower service layers
supporting the conceptually higher service layers. While any number of service
layers can be employed, any holistic communication services can be
conceptualised as being formed by two: the carrier and carriage service. The
definitions of carrier service and carriage services depend on the context. A
specific definition exists as defined by relevant legislation and a generic definition
exists (defined here) that is more useful in the discussion of communication
technologies in general. Understanding the structure of services is necessary in
order to understand the operation of both traditional and contemporary
communication technologies.
A cursory study of traditional and contemporary communication technology is
sufficient to define their fundamental differences. However, the high-level
fundamental difference is not the issue central to the ineffectiveness of law
enforcement methods for recovering information about contemporary
communication technologies. To discover the functional differences between the
two types of technologies, it is necessary to explore the background and operation
of both. A comparison can then be made that explores the operational differences.
As the goal of the paper is to explore why existing methods are not equally
effective for contemporary communication technologies, it is necessary to identify
the properties of this type of technology that cause the functional differences.
This section looks at communication services as a background to the analysis
operation of both contemporary and traditional communication technologies.
After exploring both technologies, an in-depth analysis of the differences is
conducted to identify the functional differences; these are defined as a set of
properties of contemporary communication technologies.
2.1 Communication Services
In order to understand both traditional and contemporary communication systems,
it is necessary to understand how multiple services are used and constructed
overall to deliver a service to the customer. This is fundamental to the operation
of all communication systems. As telecommunications in Australia are
predominantly regulated under the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth)
(Telecommunications Act), it is also prudent to review the relevant definitions
that the Act specifies. In order to maintain consistency, the following concepts are
explored in terminology consistent with that used in the Telecommunications Act.
This terminology is also consistent with related legislation such as the
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act of 2001 (TIA Act).
Under the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) there are two entities that provide
two different services: carriers and carriage service providers (CSP). A carrier is
a body that provides infrastructure (either physical or wireless) in order to carry
signals between points (with one point is within Australia); such infrastructure
forms part of the Australian Telecommunication Network (ATN). The role of a
carrier is to supply a carrier service. This term is not specifically defined within

38

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(4)
the Telecommunications Act but is convenient for describing the service provided
by a carrier and is therefore used frequently herein. A carrier service provides a
means of moving indiscriminate signals between two distinct points. The
Australian telecommunications company Telstra operates as a carrier by
maintaining a copper cable network. A CSP is an entity that supplies
communication services using a carrier’s infrastructure. The service supplied by a
CSP is called the carriage service. A carriage service is defined in the
Telecommunications Act as “a service for carrying communications”. Telstra also
operate as a CSP by supplying PSTN services to residential households. Many
other companies in Australia also operate as CSPs by selling PSTN services to
residential households over Telstra’s copper cable infrastructure.
In any communication system, multiple service layers are employed. In the
PSTN, the carrier service is the copper cable that is supplied to a location (such a
residence). A telephone or another carriage service is then supplied on top of the
carrier service. The supply of an Internet connection also has multilayer service
architecture. In the case of an Asynchronous Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL), the
copper line is again the carrier service. An alternative carrier service for an
Internet feed is a coaxial cable or one of many wireless options. An Internet
service provider then supplies, over the carrier service, the Internet feed and this is
a carriage service.
www

Carrier service is
the ADSL. The VPN
and VoIP are
carriage services

VoIP

VoIP

Carrier service is
the VPN. The www
and VoIP are the
carriage services

VPN

ADSL

PSTN

Copper

Carrier service is
the copper. The
ADSL and the
PSTN are carriage
services

Figure 1: An example of a network hierarchy and a description of the
carrier/carriage service layers.
The definition of carrier and CSP based on the Telecommunications Act is very
specific and is too restrictive when discussing communication systems more
broadly. In general, the important factor is the relationship between the services.
To this end, a carrier and carriage service will be used to define any pair of
communication services where one ‘carries’ the other. Internet communications
are a pertinent example of where this definition is more flexible. Figure 1 depicts
an example network hierarchy and indicates how the layers relate to each other. In
this example, the copper/PSTN and copper/ADSL have a carrier/carriage service
structure as defined under the Telecommunications Act. Based on the more
general definition as specified here, the ADSL/VoIP and ADSL/VPN have a
carrier/carriage service structure. Moving one layer higher the VPN becomes the
carrier over which a WWW and VoIP service is carried.
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This definition of carrier and carriage service will be used unless specifically
stated. Where referring to service providers in relation to the Telecommunications
Act specifically, the terms TA-carrier, TA-CSP, non TA-carrier and non TA-SCP
will be used. The distinction is important when discussing legislation, for instance
under the Telecommunications Act an ADSL connection is not seen as a carrier
service and consequently is not lawfully bound as such. Additionally, if the VoIP
service is not classified as a carriage service, it is not legally bound by the
Telecommunications Act or the TIA Act.
All communication technologies, whether traditional or contemporary, are
generally comprised of two main services, the carrier and the carriage service.
The exact meaning of these depends on whether the specific (that defined under
the Telecommunications Act) or the generic definition is being used.
Understanding what the services are and how they are combined to supply a
complete communication service is important in understand the operation of both
traditional and contemporary technologies, and furthermore to gain an
appreciation for how they differ at a functional level.
2.2 Traditional Communication Technologies
Traditional communication technologies are telephony implementations that have
existed for many years. This name ‘traditional’ is an accurate designation as this
type of telephony technology has been well established in society and for the
greater part of its existence, has been the sole implementation. The traditional
telephone began its existence in 1876 when Alexander Graham Bell famously
said, "Mr. Watson--Come here--I want to see you" to his assistant in the next
room over an early telephone prototype. At this stage, the telephone was merely a
shadow of what it would become. For well over 100 years, telephony technology
has developed and integrated into all facets of society. In 2004, there were over
two hundred million PSTN telephones in use in the United States alone
(Wallingford, 2005). While the PSTN is based on a physical cable, mobile
telephony was developed in the late 20th century allowing users to keep their
telephony service with them at all times. There are several common technologies
on which mobile telephony is implemented including the very common Global
System for Mobile Communication (GSM, from the original name, Groupe
Speciale Mobile), 2.5G, CDMA, 3G and 4G. All of these technologies are
different in specification but operate on the same basic principal and are
fundamentally the same to the user. As such, all of these implementations can be
referred to in a generic sense simply as ‘mobile telephony’.
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Figure 2: Simple Overview of the PSTN. Based on diagram from Davidson
et al. (2007)
Traditional communication technologies operate using a style of network called a
circuit switched network; this operational paradigm has not changed significantly
since its widespread adoption. The circuit switched network paradigm is based on
a fixed bandwidth connection between two endpoints (Davidson, Paters, Bhatia,
Kalidinidi & Mukherjee, 2007). While major revolutions have occurred in
telephony technology like the invention of automatic switches, the conversion
from analogue to digital signalling and the invention of mobile telephony, the
underlying architecture has always been a circuit switched network.
In a circuit switched network, connections are made between endpoints by
physically connecting a series of cables to form a single circuit. Early incarnations
of the PSTN were based on a mesh network where all endpoints were connected
to every other endpoint, creating a mesh of connections. The concept of a mesh
network is intractable for more than a small number of endpoints (Wallingford,
2005). To allow for an arbitrary number of endpoints in a scalable manner,
switches are used to switch one endpoint’s connection to any other endpoint. The
role of switches in a circuit switched network is to physically connect and
disconnect cables in order to establish a circuit between the two endpoints. The
circuit need only exist for the duration of a call; in this way, less physical
infrastructure is required for a greater number of endpoints. The first manual
switch came into operation in 1878 where a person would physically connect
different circuits together. The automatic switch was invented in 1891 negating
the need for a human operator in favour of an electronic signalling system
(Dryburgh & Hewett, 2005). In a modern setup, the PSTN contains a hierarchy of
switches. At the lowest level in the hierarchy each endpoint connects to an office
exchange switch. A series of office exchanges will in turn connect to a tandem

41

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(4)
switch which will then connect to a higher level switch (Davidson et al., 2007)
Figure 2 depicts a typical version of a PSTN network. When a circuit is
established between two endpoints, it only needs to be routed as high as necessary
in the network. Additionally, physical infrastructure may be installed between
office exchanges where traffic volume is sufficient. This allows traffic flows to be
localised and negates the need for large volumes of traffic to be routed through
the higher level switches (Davidson et al., 2007).
From early implementations of manual switches and analogue signals, the PSTN
has developed into a monolithic and highly complex digital network where
switching is performed automatically (Davidson et al., 2007; Sicker &
Lookabaugh, 2004). Much of the complexity of the network is due to the myriad
of services that are available such as voice mail, call waiting and automatic
callback. As the endpoints in the network have no processing capability, the core
of the network is responsible for implementing all of the service logic.
In supporting all of the functions required of traditional communication systems,
the various components of the network must communicate with each other in
order to appropriately carry out their required functions. When manual switching
was in use, the initiator of the call signaled to the operator using a hand crank that
would light a bulb on the operator’s desk. The operator would then talk to the
calling party to find out where the call was to be routed and would subsequently
perform the required actions (Dryburgh & Hewett, 2005). By talking to each other
the users of the system could setup the network to fulfill the primary goal i.e.
makes a telephone call to another endpoint. Automatic switching fulfills the same
goals without human intervention and uses a signaling protocol to do this. The
PSTN uses a signaling system called Signaling System Number 7 (SS7), mobile
telephony commonly uses an extended version of SS7 (Dryburgh & Hewett,
2005). Signaling within the core of the network is possible as the core systems are
all intelligent. Signaling between the core and the endpoints within the PSTN is
not possible, as the endpoints do not have the capability to process such signals.
Mobile telephony has had much more scope to evolve as the endpoints have
processing and storage capability.
2.3 Contemporary Communication Technologies
Contemporary communication technologies are those that use the Internet to
transfer data between endpoints. This designation is appropriate as they are the
revolutionary form of the long existing traditional communication technologies.
The Internet is a packet switched network that is fundamentally different to that of
the circuit switched networks used by traditional communication technologies.
While circuit switched networks are inherently based on the concept of a
connection that exists between two end-points, the Internet has no such
conception (Black, 2002). In a circuit switched network, a connection that is
created is leased for a period of time and for that duration the allocated bandwidth
is wholly dedicated to that connection regardless of how much is actually being
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used. In a packet switched network, only bandwidth that is required for
transmitting the message content is used.
Like traditional communication networks, packet switched networks also are
comprised of interconnected switches. However, the switches do not connect
circuits; they are simply responsible for receiving and then ‘forwarding’ discreet
‘chunks’ of data called packets. Instead of a dedicated, fixed bandwidth
connection between the endpoints, the packets are sent through the network, from
switch to switch, getting closer to the destination with each step. This is analogous
to the postal service where physical cables are akin to haulage routes, switches to
post offices (or a postal distribution centre) and packets to letters. When a letter is
sent over the postal network, there is no ‘connection’ between the sender and
receiver. The letter/packet is forwarded through the network to a post
office/switch that is closer to its destination with each step. In this way, an endpoint can send data to multiple discreet endpoints at the same time without using
additional infrastructure. Similarly, an endpoint can receive data from multiple
discreet endpoints simultaneously. However, unlike a circuit switched network,
the Internet cannot guarantee delivery of data, the network makes the “best effort”
it can to deliver the payload (Black, 2002). The basic functionality of the Internet
is largely useless on its own. To increase its utility, a range of protocols is used on
top of the basic structure. This is the same concept of layered services discussed
in section 0, but used in a different context. Such protocols at the lower level are
used for sending messages that span over a range of packets (sequencing),
guaranteeing delivery and allowing for multiple discreet message streams. At the
higher level, there are many protocols for implementing application specific
functions such as the World Wide Web.

Figure 3: An example of a VoIP call. The broken line represents signaling
sent to setup the call. The unbroken line represents the media (content) that
is sent between the VoIP network endpoints.
So far, the discussion of contemporary communication technologies has focused
on the underlying network and little on the communication service aspect. The
discussion of the carriage service aspect is separate from the carrier aspect as the
two parts are quite distinct. The Internet is not designed to carry any particular
type of data and human-to-human communications is only one use.
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Communication services are implemented with protocols that are carried by the
Internet. These higher-level protocols are generally developed for a specific
purpose such as VoIP or Instant Messaging. A communication system is
comprised of one or more protocols sent between one or more endpoints to fulfill
the function of communication. The endpoints can be any device that understand
the required protocols; both software and hardware endpoints are common. An
example of such a system is a VoIP phone network. If a call is placed between
two VoIP network endpoints, several protocols may be used for call management
(e.g. setup and teardown) and for transferring the content. The VoIP endpoints
may be a hardware phone and a software application both of which ‘understand’
the required protocols. Figure 3 shows an example of a VoIP network. The solid
and dotted lines indicate different protocols used in the network.
As with traditional communication networks, signaling does occur within a packet
switched network however the purpose is very different. The switches in packet
switched networks need to be able to forward packets closer their destination.
They generally have many physical connections to other switches in the network
and must be able to decide where to forward each packet. Routing protocols are
used to build information stores about a network that is used to make packetforwarding decisions. The signaling within the network has nothing specifically to
do with the communication technologies (or any other technologies) using the
network.
2.4 Traditional vs Contemporary Communication Technologies
The exploration of the operation of traditional and contemporary communication
technologies in the previous sections results in a clear distinction of the major
fundamental difference, namely the types of networks over which they operate.
The functional difference between the technologies however, is deeper than just
the underlying network operation. At the lowest level, the physical infrastructure
of a packet switched network is similar to that of a circuit switched network in
that there is a network of cables connected together with switches; it is how the
networks are used that has the significant impact on communication technologies.
Circuit switched networks as a concept has been in place for a long time. The
original PSTN system contained no logic besides that of the human beings in
within the network. When automatic switching was introduced, the intelligent
humans were replaced with intelligent machines to fulfill the same role. A highly
simplistic signaling system was added to the endpoints to replace the dialogue
with the operator. Through the development of traditional communication
technologies, the complexity of the core systems has grown while the endpoints
have evolved little. In supporting the functions for which it was designed – the
provision of voice communication – traditional communication networks perform
adequately. However, the provision of new function and features is difficult due
to the limited endpoints.
The Internet as a packet switched network was not built for a particular high-level
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function. Its role is generic, centered on carrying packets of data between
endpoints. In this way, the Internet is a generic data transfer medium. Traditional
communication systems are limited by the complexity of the core systems, the
simplicity of the endpoints and the limited signaling ability between. Systems
built on the Internet do not have this problem as there is no limitation to what the
Internet can carry between the endpoints. This difference can be described as the
logic shift property. The provision of communication services over any network
requires intelligent components that are responsible for implementing the
application logic. In traditional communication systems such as the PSTN, all of
the logic is comprised in the complex and intelligent core while the endpoints are
“quite stupid” (Cherry, 2005). When additional functionality is added to the
PSTN system (e.g. call waiting), the core systems’ logic needs to be
reprogrammed, however functionality cannot be added to the simple endpoint. In
contrast to the logic-centric traditional communication networks, the Internet has
relatively simple core systems (although are by no means ‘stupid’) and complex
endpoints. The logic in contemporary communication systems is at the ‘outside’
of the network. Contemporary communication technologies use the Internet but
are independent from it. Changing or updating the communication services has no
effect on the underlying network. Another way to look at the logic shift property
is that all of the logic of the system is comprised within the carriage service where
in traditional communication technologies, the logic resides in both the carriage
and the carrier service.
The independence of the carriage service from the carrier service in contemporary
communication technologies, caused by the logic shift property, can be defined as
the service decoupling property. In traditional communication services, the carrier
and carriage services are tightly coupled. The telecommunications provider
generally controls both and conceptually supplies them as a single service; this is
a product of the logic centric network. In both PSTN and mobile telephone
systems, the user cannot choose to use their carriage service over a different
carrier service independently of the providers. In contemporary communication
systems however, the two service layers are independent. Internet-based
communication technologies are functionally separate from the underlying carrier
service and therefore can easily be ‘moved’ when required. In general2, the user is
able to use their carriage service over any available carrier service and a carrier
service may carry any carriage service.
The logic shift property also propagates a number of other significant differences
between traditional and contemporary technologies. As the endpoints are complex
devices and are responsible for some of the functionality of the network, users
2

It is possible that the carriage and carrier service can be bound in contemporary
communication services. For instance, a VoIP phone may derive its service number
from the physical port to which it is connected. However, this is an artificial
constrained added by the communication provider.
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may be able to influence how the endpoint functions. In traditional
communication technologies, the user has little control over the endpoint, as there
is little that can be configured. This difference can be referred to as the endpoint
control property and may give users greater control over a contemporary
communication network than what they might have in traditional networks.
Another significant change is the ability for entities to supply communication
services. Traditional communication systems are extremely complex and require
expensive hardware and software. For this reason, traditional telecommunication
services are generally supplied by companies to consumers as a business.
Providers of contemporary communication services however, need not invest in
expensive hardware or software. This difference can be defined as the lower
barrier to entry property. An issue related to this is the ability for providers of
contemporary communication services to distribute their service globally; this is
referred to as the borderless supply property. Providers do not need to have any
physical presence in locations where their product is used, nor do they need to
have physical infrastructure. This is very different to providers of traditional
communication services who generally require both physical infrastructure and
presence in localities where they distribute their product.
The legislation that relates to communication services is another notable
difference between traditional and contemporary communication technologies.
All traditional communication services are comprised of carrier and carriage
service providers as defined under the Telecommunications Act. In Australia,
only certain types of Internet-based communication services are deemed CSPs
under the Telecommunications Act. Non TA-CSPs do not have any obligations
under the Telecommunications Act or the TIA Act. Regulation of communication
networks is overseen by the Australian Communications and Media Authority
(ACMA). With the rise in popularity of contemporary communication services,
ACMA has taken steps to ensure that where contemporary communication
technologies are supplied as replacement to traditional communication systems,
they are classified as TA-CSPs. ACMA has defined four classifications of VoIP:

1. Peer to peer – Internet only, calls do not use the traditional
telephone network, the public switched telephone network
(PSTN)
2. VoIP Out – a service where calls can be made from the VoIP
network to the PSTN
3. VoIP In – a service which allow calls to be made from the PSTN
to the VoIP service using a telephone number
4. Two way – a service which allows calls to be made both ways
between the VoIP service and the PSTN using telephone
numbers (Australian Communications and Media Authority,
2010b).
46
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The ACMA web site states that all categories with the exception of the peer-topeer category are “generally” classified as carriage services (It is unclear exactly
what is meant by “generally” as no distinction is made in any of the relevant
legislation) (Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2010b). Where a
contemporary communication service is deemed by ACMA as a carriage service,
the provider has the same obligations as traditional CSPs. Where the service falls
outside of this classification, it can also be regarded as an Internet application.
This difference between traditional and contemporary communication
technologies can be designated as the Internet application property.
The Internet as a carrier service allows communication systems that operate and
behave very differently from traditional systems. At an implementation level, the
primary difference is the style of network; traditional communication systems use
a circuit switched network where contemporary communication systems use the
Internet, which is a packet switched network. The Internet does not have one
particular function; it is generic in its nature. For this reason, the intelligent parts
in contemporary communication systems reside at the endpoints of the network;
this is the logic shift property. The logic shift property is important to understand
as it gives rise to another four properties of contemporary communication
networks: the service decoupling property, the endpoint control property, the
lower barrier to entry property and the borderless supply property. These
properties of contemporary communication technologies are important they are
responsible for the differences in the two types of technology on a functional
level. This paper explores the investigation methods used by law enforcement and
the defined functional differences hold the key to the utility and effectiveness of
the methods.
3. INVESTIGATION OF COMMUNICATIONS
This section deals with the way that communication technology is investigated. It
first looks at the range of methods that law enforcement currently uses for
obtaining information and at the techniques used for discovering what services a
target is using, or who is using a given target. It then looks at the three primary
methods for obtaining data about a target’s use of communication technologies:
communication interception, access of stored information and post-mortem
analysis. Section 0 explores how the methods are currently applied to traditional
communication technologies. It further looks at the application of the methods to
contemporary communication technologies. The contemporary communication
properties identified in 0 are used to identify where the incompatibilities lie.
Finally, a case study shows examples of the application of communications
interception, access of stored information and post mortem analysis where used
by law enforcement. The case study further provides a hypothetical situation in
each instance that seeks to explore the impact on the outcomes where targets used
Internet-based communication technologies.
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3.1 Lawfully Obtaining Information
In law enforcement investigations, it is common that a target’s use of
communication services should be explored. Information about the use of a
telecommunication service can be one of two types, the content of the actual
communication or data about content; the latter is called metadata. In both cases
this data can be obtained from two sources, the core systems of the
communication system or from the target if the data is in their possession
(generally residing on the endpoint device). In Australia a person’s right for their
data to remain private is covered under various acts of legislation with the Privacy
Act 1988 (Cth) (Privacy Act) chief among these. The location of the data, within
either the network or the endpoint, dictates the affecting laws under which the
data can be recovered. When data are in the possession of the owner, the rights of
that person concerning the data are the same as with anything, material or
otherwise, that is owned by that person. Items owned by a person cannot simply
be acquired without their permission or lawful request (search and seizure). When
data are in the possession of the owner, it is irrelevant (in relation to legislation)
whether the data are content or metadata; the law is applied equally to both.
However, when data are obtained from within the Australian
Telecommunications Network (ATN) (the infrastructure owned by the listed TAcarriers), there are three acts of legislation that govern a user’s right to privacy,
the TIA Act, the Privacy Act of 1988 and the Telecommunications Act. The TIA
Act covers the interception and access of the content of communications as they
pass over the ATN. The Telecommunications Act and the Privacy Act cover the
privacy of a user’s personal information, which includes their personal particulars
and communication metadata.
3.1.1 Communication Interception
Access to communication content while it resides within the ATN is governed by
the TIA Act. The TIA Act defines this type of data as a “communication” and is
defined as follows:

communication includes conversation and a message, and any part of a
conversation or message, whether:
(a) in the form of:
(i) speech, music or other sounds;
(ii) data;
(iii) text;
(iv) visual images, whether or not animated; or
(v) signals; or
(b) in any other form or in any combination of forms
(Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979).
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Stored communications that reside on the ATN are also specifically accounted for
under the TIA Act. A stored communication is one that is in transit between
endpoints but is temporarily stored within the network. An example of a stored
communication in this context is an SMS message that has not yet been
transferred to the recipient’s mobile phone. Prior to the Telecommunications
(Interception) Amendment Act 2006 (Cth), such communications were not
considered as ‘in transit’. Stored communications then fell under the
Telecommunications Act as retained data allowing easier access by law
enforcement (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2006b).
Intercepting communications en-route over the ATN is illegal. In order for law
enforcement to lawfully to do this, the TIA Act provides exemptions. The TIA
Act contains a warrant regime in Chapter 2 Part 2-5 and Chapter 3, the latter
relating specifically to stored communications (Telecommunications (Interception
and Access) Act 1979). Warrants for interception of communication content can
be issued by authorised eligible authorities. Such authorities, nominated by the
Attorney General, may be judges or members of the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal (AAT) (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2006c). Warrants for interception
of communication can only be authorised for crimes that are considered “serious”.
Serious crimes are explicitly defined in section 5D of the TIA Act. In protecting
the privacy of users of telecommunication systems, the TIA Act also specifies a
range of issues of which the issuer of the warrant must be satisfied before
providing authorisation. The authorising judge or AAT member must consider
matters such as “how much the privacy of any person or persons would be likely
to be interfered” and “the gravity of the conduct constituting the offence [that is
being investigated]” (Electronic Frontiers Australia, 2006c).
The content of a communication may be considered the ‘holy grail’ of
information when investigating a target however the protection law surrounding
access to this information is very clear. In comparison to retained data (discussed
in 0), gaining lawful access to content data is much more difficult. Where clear
need is established and proper judicial requirements are fulfilled, law enforcement
can gain much information about targets and their activities. For this reason, this
information gathering method is very powerful and an invaluable asset.
3.1.2 Access of Stored Information
In obtaining data from within the telecommunications network, law enforcement
may collect a user’s particulars or information about a user’s activity that has been
stored by the provider. Telecommunication providers collect various types of
information about users and their activity. Depending on jurisdiction, data may be
collected for business purposes of the provider (e.g. billing) or legislation may
force the collection and retention of such data. In the latter case, such legislation
may be consumer focussed for such requirements as itemised billing or for
national security purposes. In 2006, the European Union (EU) adopted a directive
that specifies policy for retention of such data (Council Directive (CE)

49

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 6(4)
2006/24/EC). The Australian Government is currently considering adopting laws
based on this directive (Grubb, 2010a, 2010b; LeMay, 2010). This would force
some providers to store certain information for definite a period of time for
increasing the power of law enforcement investigations. Communication
metadata (such as the user’s personal details) and activity details (such as call
records) are considered personal information. Under ordinary circumstances, the
average person has a right to privacy concerning their own personal information.
The Australian Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 defines personal information
as:
information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a
database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form or not,
about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained,
from the information or opinion” (Privacy Act 1988).
The collection of retained data in a telecommunications system is governed by the
Telecommunications Act and the Privacy Act. Section 13 of the
Telecommunications Act states that “... carriage service providers ... must protect
the confidentiality of information that relates to ... (c) the affairs or personal
particulars of other persons” (Telecommunications Act 1997). There are no
specific definitions under the law of what retained data is, however the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute defines five categories of retained data:
subscriber, usage, equipment, network element and additional service usage
(European Telecommunications Standards Institute, 2009). Electronic Frontiers
Australia (EFA) further define examples of retained data from the from an
Internet Service Provider (ISP) point of view (Electronic Frontiers Australia,
2006a).
Before employing information gathering methods to gain either content or
metadata, law enforcement investigators may need to identify services that are
used by the target, or may need to identify the target that uses a particular service.
In Australia, all traditional communication technologies that connect to the ATN
are assigned a number, generally referred to as a ‘phone number’. Law
enforcement has access to the Integrated Public Number Database (IPND). The
IPND is a database of all numbers that can be used within the ATN for connecting
carriage services. The database records current information about the numbers
and includes information like the current user’s details (name, address etc), the
issuing carriage service provider, whether the number is unlisted and if the
recorded address of the number is likely to be located at the customers service
address. The IPND has several functions. The primary function is for the public
and is to provide directory assistance. For this purpose, phone numbers can be
supplied given an entity’s particulars (the term entity is used here, as the ‘owner’
of a number may not be a person). The use of system in reverse, called a reverse
lookup, is not allowed to the public, as this would contravene the privacy
legislation. However, reverse lookups can be used for emergency services in order
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to help locate users based on the originating number. Law enforcement agencies
are also allowed to use the IPND this way. Access to the database for this reason
is governed in the same way as other personal information stored by a carrier or
CSP (under section 13 of the Telecommunications Act) (Australian
Communications and Media Authority, 2010a).
For the lawful collection of retained data stored by telecommunications providers,
the Telecommunications Act provides law enforcement agencies with several
avenues. Any request for data made under law, such as a warrant, requires the
carrier or carriage service provider to supply the relevant data. Section 282 of part
13 of the Act however, provides means for data acquisition that does not need to
be made via a warrant. Law enforcement agencies can make requests to the
provider that may be either certified or uncertified. Certified requests are issued
with certification from a senior officer who declares that the disclosure is
“reasonably necessary”. Uncertified requests are not issued with such
certification and provider must be satisfied that the disclosure is “reasonably
necessary” for the enforcement of criminal law (Electronic Frontiers Australia,
2006a; Australian Communications and Media Authority, 2010c). In carrying out
such requests, service providers must also comply with the Privacy Act.
There are several avenues that law enforcement can use to recover stored
information about targets and their use of communication. The information is
protected by law but in general, where there is a clear need, the information can
be obtained with relative ease. In comparison to interception of communication
content, the safeguards for accessing this type of information are less stringent.
However, personal particulars and records of activity are in general considered
less private that the content of communications.
3.1.3 Post Mortem Analysis
During the course of a lawful investigation, data may be seized from a suspect
with the use of a warrant or during an arrest. In relation to traditional
communications, items that may be seized are anything that contains information
about the user’s activities. An example of this is the seizure of mobile telephones
that include phone call records and SMS messages (this is both content and
metadata). A warrant is usually required as is the case with any search and
seizure. Warrants for lawful search and seizure laws vary between different states
and the federal jurisdiction. In South Australia, warrants can be issued under
several acts of legislation most notably the Summary Offences Act of 1953 and
the Crimes Act of 1914. Australian federal law enforcement can obtain warrants
for search and seizure under the Commonwealth’s Crimes Act of 1914.
3.2 Application of Investigation Methods
In order to determine how the functional differences between traditional and
contemporary communication technologies affect the methods used by law
enforcement, it is necessary to look at how these methods are applied. In section
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0, six properties of contemporary communication technologies were defined.
These properties represent functional differences between traditional and Internetbased communication technologies; Table 1 recaps the meaning of these
properties.
Table 1: Properties of Contemporary Communication Technologies
representing the functional differences to traditional communication
technologies

Logic shift property

Endpoint control
property
Service decoupling
property
Lower barrier to entry
property

Borderless supply
property
Internet application
property

The ‘intelligent’ parts of the networks are
conceptually located at the outside of the
network.
The endpoints of the network are more
intelligent and have increased flexibility and
configurability.
The carrier and carriage service are
independent rather than coupled as a single
indecomposable package.
The provision of carriage services is
inexpensive and requires low technical
knowledge allowing services to be supplied by
more entities
Carriage service providers do not need local
infrastructure or presence in order to supply
service effectively.
The carriage service is categorised an ‘Internet
application’ and therefore is not bound as a
carriage service under the Telecommunications
Act 1997.

After exploring how the methods are applied to traditional communication
technologies, a direct comparison can be made with contemporary
communication technologies. The identified properties are used to highlight
where the incompatibilities between the target technology and the methods lie.
3.2.1 Communication Interception
The use of communications interception by law enforcement is a highly effective
and robust method. This robustness is afforded due to the legislation under the
TIA Act that forces TA-CSPs to provide and maintain an interception capability.
When this method is used to intercept the content of traditional communication
technologies, there is little the user can do to prevent this from happening as it is
dictated by the endpoint control property. End-to-end encryption is one possibility
however this is uncommon because it requires expensive hardware that is not
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easily accessible to the layperson.
The application of content interception is quite different in relation to
contemporary communication services. When considering this issue, the Internet
application property must be taken into account. Where the carriage service is not
deemed an Internet application, it falls under the Telecommunications Act and the
situation is similar to that of traditional communications; however, the endpoint
control property does not apply, affording the user greater flexibility to alter the
operation of the service. The service decoupling property does not greatly affect
this situation as the CSP intercepts the data at the carriage level3. As with
traditional communication systems, the users can employ end-to-end encryption
over the service. Due to the endpoint control property this is much simpler to
implement as it can be performed in software; specialist hardware is not required.
If users employ this method, collection of the content anywhere between the
endpoints will result in only encrypted data; neither the service provider nor the
law enforcement body will be able to easily recover the original communication.
Note that encryption implemented by the CSP will not be an issue for law
enforcement as the interception system must allow for collection of the
unencrypted data.
Where the contemporary communication service has the Internet application
property, interception of the content may be very difficult. Due to the service
decoupling property, the collection may occur at either the carrier (i.e. the Internet
feed) or carriage level with very different results. Collection at the carriage level
requires compliance the CSP. Without lawful directive, the CSP may not be
willing to carry out such actions, or may not have the necessary facilities to do so.
Due to the lower barrier to entry property, the provider may be very different to
that of a traditional communications provider. Providers of traditional
communication services are generally locally based and sizable companies and in
many cases have no reason to hinder police investigations. Providers of Internet
application type communication services may be internationally based (borderless
supply property) with no local presence or may even be a single individual with
an amateur setup. Such providers can supply the same service as that of a local
provider but may have less need or ability to provide assistance to law
enforcement. The locality or size of the operation does not dictate the level of
assistance that would be afforded to law enforcement officials, however it may be
factor in many cases. Interception of this type of communication service at the
carrier level negates the need to work in conjunction with the CSP. The issue with
this approach is the carriage service mobility due to the service decoupling
property. Any use of the carriage service over a carrier service not being
3

Interception of content at the carrier level is possible but unlikely in the situation
where it can be performed at the carriage level. However, if this does occur, the
problems are the same as those described in the situation where the carriage service is
not considered a carriage service as defined under the Telecommunications Act.
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intercepted will be missed. Encryption is also a problem with this approach as
both end-to-end encryption and that implemented by the service provider will
render the approach ineffective.
3.2.2 Access of Stored Information
The access of stored information, like communication interception, is a robust
data acquisition method. It is also supported in legislation by the
Telecommunications Act. Law enforcement has avenues for accessing the
information from the service provider both with and without a warrant. For the
user of the communication service, there are few methods to avoid having this
information collected. For the collection of personal particulars, the user may be
able to obtain certain services with a false or alternate name preventing law
enforcement from accessing the real information. For activity-related information
(such as call data records or SMS activity records), there is no way to prevent the
CSP from recording this information.
Again, when considering access of stored information as applied to contemporary
communication services, the Internet application property must be considered
separately. Where the implementation is not an Internet application, the situation
will be the same as with traditional communication technologies. For user activity
data, neither the service decoupling property nor the endpoint control property
presents an issue for law enforcement as the CSP must be able to receive this data
to perform the functions of the system (i.e. one cannot encrypt the intended
destination of the communication as the communication system could not use this
information to perform its functions). With the support of the
Telecommunications Act, law enforcement agencies will always be able to access
this information lawfully. Personal particular information, as with traditional
communication technologies, must be collected by the CSP however in some
cases it may be possible to provide false information.
Where the carriage service is an Internet application, law enforcement many be
restricted in its ability to collected retained information. Such providers do not
have any legal obligation to collect either information about users or information
about their activities. Even where personal information is collected, police have
limited options in forcing the provider to share the information. This effect is
predominately due to the lower barrier to entry and the borderless supply
properties of contemporary communication technologies. The former allows
almost any person or company to offer services who may have no need for
collecting such information, or may even explicitly not collect it as a ‘feature’ for
a secure communication service.
3.2.3 Post Mortem Analysis
The application of post-mortem analysis for gaining information about
communication technologies is quite different to the other common methods.
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Post-mortem analysis relies on obtaining information from the source rather than
via a service provider (or service provider’s infrastructure). The information
gained may be a mix of content, metadata and other types of communication and
non-communication data. Unlike the other methods, there are no laws specifically
supporting access of communication data by this method. Law enforcement
practitioners must rely on good methods for extracting all of the information
available on the target device.
In traditional communication technologies, post-mortem analysis is only useful
for the analysis of mobile phones; PSTN endpoints have no processing or storage
capabilities. Traditionally there have been little protections from the use of sound
post-mortem analysis techniques on mobile phones; protections such as a PIN on
the phone and SIM card are generally quite rudimentary to bypass with the aid of
the telecommunication companies and forensic software and hardware. Full disk
encryption has not generally been available to users on most mobile phone
handsets.
The shift towards contemporary communications is somewhat blurred concerning
mobile phones. The growth of smart phones has morphed the average mobile
phone into a small but powerful computer. Smart phones still generally support
traditional communication functions but also commonly support Internet and user
installable applications and therefore also support contemporary communication
technologies. The increased use of such devices for holding personal data has
amplified demand for encryption and the increased power has supported this.
Technically strong and properly supported encryption is an issue for law
enforcement as decrypting may be infeasible. Furthermore, contemporary
communication services used via the mobile phone may not use the local storage
media and instead opt for a remote storage location. While analysis may confirm
the service is in use, there may be no feasible methods for recovering the data
stored on the remote server.
3.3 Case Study
In order to provide an overview of how the uptake of contemporary
communication technologies may change the way in which investigations are
conducted or may unfold, several cases are studied where information from
communication systems were used. The case study does not seek to assert that the
results would have varied in the referenced cases should contemporary
communications technologies have been used, but rather it seeks to provide a
thought experiment to assess the possibilities.
3.3.1 Case 1
This case involved a conspiracy to import illegal substances in commercial
quantities (El-Jalkh, Antoine v R [2009] NSWCCA 139 2009). Law enforcement
officials were notified of the conspiracy by an informant and subsequently
obtained a warrant for the interception of communications on the target’s mobile
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telephone service; the collection included both voice calls and SMS to and from
the target. Both the SMS content and voice recordings from the interception were
used in the trial to establish the facts of the case.
If the key parties in the above scenario had been using contemporary
communication technologies, the investigators may not have been able to collect
as much relevant communication content. An application such as Skype could
have been used for placing phone calls that were secure from interception.
Interception of the target’s Internet service (carrier level) would have provided no
benefit due to the encryption. Interception may still have been possible if it
occurred on another target’s telephone service where Skype was used to place a
call to, or receive a call from that service. SMS or SMS-like messages could also
have been sent using Skype or other applications that provided encryption.
Furthermore, the offender could have used alternate Internet connections to send
data providing a further barrier to interception.
While the investigators collected evidence from a variety of sources including
witness testimony and hidden recording devices, the case may have been
weakened had they not been able to intercept the content of communications used
for carrying out the crime and present it as evidence.
3.3.2 Case 2
In a case involving a homicide, stored records of phone call and SMS activity
were used as evidence (R v Wilkinson (No. 5) [2009] NSWSC 432 2009). In this
case, a pattern of activity was used to establish information about the mindset of
the offender. By using source, destination and time information about the
communications from the target’s telephone service, the prosecution was able to
demonstrate to the court the “intensity” of the relationship between two people. It
was further able to indicate the state of mind of the offender by a change in the
pattern of sent text messages around the time of a significant event. While the
information was not used as a single piece of evidence, it was important
information used to support the facts of the case.
In the above case, if the offender had used an Internet-based communication
technology, the pertinent evidence may not have been available. Instead of
standard SMS messages from a traditional mobile phone service, the offender
could have used an application such as Skype to send SMS or instant messages. In
such a case, the investigators may not have been able to access records about the
communications between the two people thus potentially limiting the
prosecution’s case.
3.3.3 Case 3
In a case involving a person being charged for the supply of a prohibited drug, the
contents of a text message on the target’s mobile phone were used to support the
prosecutors case that the person was a supplier of drugs (Zahrooni v R; Director
of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v Zahrooni [2010] NSWCCA 252 2010). On
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arresting the offender for the possession of prohibited substances, a search of his
mobile phone revealed an SMS text message soliciting the procurement of drugs.
The content of the message was subsequently used in convicting the offender.
The above case relied on a physical examination of the offender’s device. The
offender did not employ any countermeasures in order to stop examination of data
on the device. If the offender had have been using an Internet-based
communication technology, the retrieval of the evidence many not have been
possible. Such an application may not store information on the local device and
may have provided additional protection by forcing the user to supply credentials
before being able to obtain the data. Additionally, the user may have been able to
encrypt the contents of the storage volumes, protecting it from physical recovery
of remnant information. Although such an application may not exist in this form
currently, it would be easy for it to be designed and implemented. Such an
application could include many measures that protect information for the specific
purpose of avoiding law enforcement.
4. CONCLUSION
The digital age has seen a dramatic shift in the way that technology affects many
aspects of daily life. As technology evolves, users will naturally gravitate towards
the implementations that make their life easier, more convenient and more
fulfilled. Communication tools are a prime example of the evolution of
technology being embraced by both providers and users. The Internet has allowed
the creation of novel communication services that surpass, in terms of
functionality, traditional technologies such as the PSTN and mobile phones.
While there are many advantages to explosion of new communication
technologies through the community, there are several notable disadvantages.
Among these is the ability for law enforcement to carry out information recovery
during investigations effectively. Primarily, law enforcement needs
methodologies for obtaining information about targets and their use of
communication technologies. A set of sound and rigorous methods exist to target
traditional technologies. However, newer Internet-based technologies are
functionally very different and as a result, the existing methodologies that were
previously quite effective are now largely incompatible for use on new and
emerging communication technologies.
The investigation of communication technologies is an important activity that law
enforcement agencies carry out. Traditional communication technologies are so
pervasive in society that many crimes will inevitably involve their use at some
point. It is important that methodologies are rigorous and well designed in order
to be effective. The consequences of methodologies that are not built on rigorous
principals are dire. Missing or improperly obtained information may lead to
incorrect conclusions or inadmissible evidence in a court of law. Over the
extensive lifespan of traditional communication technologies, methodologies have
been built that support the acquisition of information in a legally sound and
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rigorous manner. In obtaining information about the use of traditional
communication technologies, police use a combination of communication
interception, access of stored information and use of post-mortem analysis. Two
major factors support these methods, legislation and the nature of the technology.
The legislation is effective in allowing law enforcement to carry out certain
activities but also in forcing service providers to operate in certain ways that
support law enforcement (e.g. collecting certain types of information). The
‘nature of the technology’ is more nuanced. It effectively relates to the low level
of control the user has over the technology that largely prevents the users from
circumventing law enforcement methods of obtaining information.
The methodologies used for investigation of traditional communication
technologies are well suited to their purpose. As the target technologies have
existed for many years and have evolved little over this time, the methods have
evolved and become sound and rigorous. However, they have also become
specific to their intended use. This means they are inflexible and do not cope well
with altered parameters. Internet based communication services are very different
to traditional communication technologies. Primarily, where the operation of
traditional communication technologies is very rigid, Internet-based technologies
are highly variable. The methodologies that have developed for the investigation
of traditional communication technologies may not be effective against
contemporary communication technologies in many cases.
Internet-based communication technologies can have several properties that
reduce the utility of current investigation methods. The logic shift property was
discussed as the root of many of the properties that cause the ineffectiveness of
current methods. From this property, the endpoint control property, service
decoupling property, lower barrier to entry property and the borderless supply
property are propagated. The Internet application property is also a major
influence in the potential effectiveness of law enforcement methodologies. Each
of the identified properties affects the application of methods for obtaining
information in different ways. The Internet application property was shown to be
very influential in determining whether the service providers had to meet
obligations under the relevant legislation. It was shown that where a
communication service was not an Internet application, it was generally
susceptible to the current law enforcement methods. It is possible that users with
some technical skills could implement end-to-end encryption over the carriage
service to prevent communication interception. Similarly skilled users could also
use encryption products for encrypting media sources preventing post-mortem
analysis. In all cases, access to stored information still applies as users can do
nothing to prevent this. For the average user, or those not deliberately
implementing measures to impede law enforcement, current investigation
methods will be successful where the communication service is not an Internet
application.
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Law enforcement investigation methods where the carriage service is an Internet
application were shown to be ineffective in many instances. When carrying out
communications interception, the provider has no legal obligation to assist law
enforcement. The use of interception at the carrier level circumvents the carriage
service provider but the service decoupling property will mean that
communications may be missed, and the use of encryption will render this
approach ineffective. Another layer of complexity is added by the lower barrier to
entry and the borderless supply properties that affect both communication
interception and access of stored information. The carriage service provider could
potentially be anyone located anywhere in the world. This may make even
attempting to interface with the provider very difficult, let alone accessing the
required information. These properties potentially allow the provision of services
for the direct purpose of secure communication that cannot be intercepted or
recovered by third parties; this is contrary to traditional communication services
where such a service would be illegal. Even users with low technical skills could
employ these services to utilise secure communication greatly increasing the
potential user-base.
The increasing complexity of end-user devices is another change that works
against law enforcement methodologies. Many devices now have built in
encryption that can be easily activated by even technically low-skilled users. This
will prevent the use of post-mortem analysis to recover any information stored on
the device. More highly skilled users can employ advanced techniques such as
data obfuscation or plausible deniable encryption to add a layer of complexity to
an investigation.
The legislation supporting current methodologies and the inherent nature of
traditional communication technologies provides an almost ‘ideal’ situation for
law enforcement. However, contemporary communication technologies may
always provide a challenge due to its very nature. Even with a widened scope of
current laws to incorporate Internet-based carriage services in the same way as
traditional carriage services, the lower barrier to entry and the borderless supply
properties mean that such laws may be very difficult to enforce.
Many of the functional differenced defined here will only have an impact on law
enforcement in the ‘worse case’ scenario. When discussing why a given methods
may not be applicable to an Internet-based communication implementation, a
common theme was a lack of help, or active hindrance by the provider. The case
study also assume worst case scenario assuming that encryption would be used or
providers would not provide law enforcement with information. In many cases,
Internet-based carriage service providers may not hinder law enforcement
investigations and may in actively help. Anecdotal information suggests that law
enforcement is often aided by the providers of Skype to recover both metadata
and content. However, Internet-based communication technologies may still pose
issues in other ways, like identifying that they are being used.
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The functional differences between traditional and contemporary communication
technologies have been defined as a set of properties that are inherent to the latter.
These properties are the core reason that in many cases the current methods used
by law enforcement for obtaining information about the use of communication
technologies are ineffective. As the uptake of contemporary communication
technologies increases, law enforcement will be under mounting pressure to
investigate their use effectively. They require additional methods to fit in with the
current methodologies for obtaining information where these technologies are
being used. The defined properties provide a starting point for the exploration of
future methods to add to existing methodologies.
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